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ABSTRACT
BGP communities are a mechanism widely used by operators to
manage policy, mitigate attacks, and engineer tra￿c; e.g., to drop
unwanted tra￿c, ￿lter announcements, adjust local preference, and
prepend paths to in￿uence peer selection.
Unfortunately, we show that BGP communities can be exploited
by remote parties to in￿uence routing in unintended ways. The
BGP community-based vulnerabilities we expose are enabled by a
combination of complex policies, error-prone con￿gurations, a lack
of cryptographic integrity and authenticity over communities, and
the wide extent of community propagation. Due in part to their
ill-de￿ned semantics, BGP communities are often propagated far
further than a single routing hop, even though their intended scope
is typically limited to nearby ASes. Indeed, we ￿nd 14% of transit
ASes forward received BGP communities onward. Given the rich
inter-connectivity of transit ASes, this means that communities
e￿ectively propagate globally. As a consequence, remote adversaries
can use BGP communities to trigger remote blackholing, steer tra￿c,
and manipulate routes even without pre￿x hijacking. We highlight
examples of these attacks via scenarios that we tested and measured
both in the lab as well as in the wild. While we suggest what can be
done to mitigate such ill e￿ects, it is up to the Internet operations
community whether to take up the suggestions.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) communicates reachability
information between neighbors in the Internet. As the network
evolved, the complexity of connections, policies, and economics
drove the need for similarly complex and ￿ne-grained routing poli-
cies [30, 44, 45]. As a result BGP, the de facto inter-domain routing
protocol, has been extended to help support such policies, and
provide value-added services. This work focuses on one such exten-
sion, BGP communities [25], and the implications of its real-world
implementation and deployment.
BGP communities are an optional transitive BGP attribute used
to “tag” advertisements. Operators frequently con￿gure their in-
frastructure to take di￿erent actions depending on community tags.
So, communities provide not only a common label for groups of
pre￿xes, but also the ability to signal semantics between ASes and
between routers within an AS.
BGP communities are increasingly popular and are used to en-
code an ever-wider variety of information [28, 29, 34, 36]. Within
the last year the number of observable communities increased by
roughly 20%, see Section 4. As we describe in Section 2, communi-
ties are used to realize routing policies, bias path or peer selection,
steer tra￿c, etc. ASes also use communities to o￿er value-added
services for customers of ISPs and members of IXPs including tag-
ging of route ingress points and origins [4, 34, 37], selective ad-
vertisement [26, 35, 38, 52], tra￿c engineering [29, 48, 55], and
Remotely Triggered Blackholing (RTBH), i.e., dropping of traf-
￿c to a target destination to mitigate Denial-of-Service-Attacks
(DoS) [27, 28, 36, 47]. Some providers even use communities to
encode latency information [6, 7].
While BGP communities are a seemingly innocuous feature, we
show that they can be used to in￿uence routing in unintended ways.
Although the community-based attacks we consider require certain
conditions for success, we show that these conditions hold su￿-
ciently widely to warrant operational attention. Importantly, since
our extensive measurements show that communities are widely
propagated, see Section 4, an attacker exploiting the BGP communi-
ties of a particular AS need not be a directly connected peer. Further,
we demonstrate the feasibility of attacks both with and without
address space hijacking, suggesting that existing hijack detection
methods are insu￿cient to detect community-based attacks.
The attacks are the result of weaknesses in the current use and
implementation of BGP communities and community-based ser-
vices. Services enabled by communities are typically relevant only
between directly connected ASes – for instance, an AS tagging a
backup route with a community to indicate that the remote AS
should use a lower local preference. Intuitively then, one might
expect communities to not propagate through multiple ASes, or
beyond their intended destination AS. However, via large-scale
analysis of passive BGP datasets, we ￿nd that more than 50% of the
BGP communities traverse more than four ASes and we see 10%
with a hop count of more than six, see Section 4.
To better assess the potential vulnerabilities enabled by BGP
communities, we design multiple scenarios that highlight inten-
tional, unintentional, and malicious community use in Section 5.
These include the ability to remotely signal blackholing of a pre￿x
for which the attacking AS is not responsible, tra￿c steering, and
route manipulation of another AS’s pre￿xes.
To demonstrate the vulnerabilities of community handling in
practice, we conducted two classes of experiments while ensuring
prior coordination and permission of all involved ASes and net-
works, see Section 7.1. First, we tested in the lab the conditions
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that must hold to realize the attacks; ￿nding default and recom-
mended con￿gurations which enable the attacks we considered.
Using insights from the lab, we conducted experiments in the wild
to demonstrate the feasibility of these attacks in the real Internet.
Our evaluation in the wild shows that, unfortunately, some of the
BGP community-based attacks are easy to achieve. In some attack
settings, e.g., when the attacker is on the AS path, even without
hijacking and even if BGP route validation is used.
In summary, the community attacks we demonstrate are the
result of weaknesses in the current use and implementation of BGP
communities and community-based services including: community
propagation behavior, complex policies, error-prone con￿gurations,
and a lack of cryptographic integrity and authenticity for commu-
nities. The main contributions of this paper are:
(1) We analyze BGP community propagation (Section 4) show-
ing that 2.2K networks forward received BGP communities
onward. We show that the majority of communities are prop-
agated through the entire Internet.
(2) We highlight this routing system can of worms and identify
su￿cient conditions for community-based attacks on the
routing system (in Section 3).
(3) We sketch three scenarios of how BGP communities can be
misused (Section 5).
(4) We show that these attacks are possible in lab experiments
and in the wild (Sections 6 and 7). We highlight tra￿c drop-
ping due to remotely triggered blackholing, as well as remote
steering of tra￿c and route manipulation, possibly through
an interceptor, i.e., a rogue tra￿c monitor.
(5) We provide recommendations on the use of communities in
Section 8.
2 BGP COMMUNITIES: A PRIMER
Communities are an optional BGP attribute used as a signaling
mechanism within and between ASes [25]. While the 32-bit com-
munity ￿eld1 can take any value, by convention the ￿rst 16 bits rep-
resent the AS Number (ASN) of the entity de￿ning the community,
while the last 16 bits indicate an action or label. The human-readable
community presentation format separates numeric representations
of the ASN and label with a colon, e.g., 3130:411.
There is only a small set of standardized well-known community
labels, e.g., NO_EXPORT (65535:65281) indicates a route should
not leave a BGP confederation, NO_PEER (65535:65284) [46] in-
dicates a route should not be propagated via a bilateral peering
link, and 65535:666 the standardized blackhole community [47].
These well-known communities cover a very small subset of all
communities in use (Section 4) and the complex routing policies
network operators realize via BGP communities. Indeed, an AS is
free to de￿ne (or leave unde￿ned) the semantics of the 216 possi-
ble values for its communities. For example, in the previous ex-
ample, AS 3130 “owns” communities 3130:XXXX and may de￿ne
them arbitrarily. It is important to note, that there are no explicit
mechanisms to enforce this segmentation of the community space,
and any AS is free to add, delete, or modify the communities of
1With the advent of 32-bit ASNs, RFC8092 [42] introduces “large” 96-bit communities.
In this paper, we focus on traditional 32-bit communities as they already o￿er many
intriguing scenarios. We leave an extended investigation of large, extended, and private
communities to future work.
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Figure 1: Policies with BGP communities: AS1 requests path
prepending by tagging AS3:103 towards AS3, and informs its
peers that pre￿x p1 is a customer pre￿x, by attaching com-
munity AS1:200. At the same time AS6 uses communities
AS6:201 and AS6:202 to signal where a route is learned.
BGP advertisements that transit its control plane with impunity.
Indeed, even cryptographic proposals to protect the authenticity
and integrity of routing announcements do not cover BGP commu-
nities [24, 40, 41, 43, 50].
Communities can be added, deleted, or set by an AS on pre￿x
origination, ingress, or egress. Bonaventure et al. were the ￿rst to
propose a taxonomy of community values [23, 29] and identi￿ed
two main modes of operation. First, there are AS-internal commu-
nities that are set when receiving a route. Second, communities
labeled on egress are commonly used to signal or pass information
down the path. Such outbound communities carry a broad spectrum
of meanings, but most fall into the following categories according
to [29]: (a) route selection: adjustment of local_pref and AS path
prepending, (b) selective announcement: routes are labeled accord-
ing to which class of ASes (peer, transit) or even speci￿c ASes they
should be announced to, (c) route suppression: same as (b), but
states explicitly to whom not to announce a route, (d) blackholing:
tra￿c towards this pre￿x, mostly /32s (in IPv4) should be dropped,
and (e) location: to signal where a route has been learned.
Figure 1 illustrates some ways communities are commonly used
in practice. Here, AS6 tags incoming routes with the geographic lo-
cation where the pre￿x was received, in this case from Los Angeles
(LAX) and Frankfurt (FRA). The ￿rst part of the community denotes
AS6, while the values 201 and 202 are chosen by AS6 to indicate
the location. Further, AS3 de￿nes the received community AS3:103
to prepend its AS three times to path. AS1 can then perform route
selection by attaching the community AS3:103 to the announce-
ment of p1 to AS3. Once AS4 receives both announcements for p1,
it will prefer the shorter path via AS2.
The level of community support as well as documentation varies
considerably among providers. Some networks, especially large
ISPs [10, 11] and IXPs [1, 3, 4, 19] implement ￿ne-grained seman-
tics using as many as hundreds of communities. Unfortunately,
there is no central database of record for providers’ communities
and associated actions, but rather scattered and incomplete docu-
mentation. In reality, this boils down to networks documenting the
communities relevant to their peers and customers on their web-
site and/or in Regional Internet Registries (RIR)/Internet Routing
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Figure 2: BGP communities scenario: AS path prepending.
Registries (IRR) [8]. We, therefore, lack a de￿nitive understanding
of the global de￿nitions and use of communities.
Further complicating the use of communities is that there is no
strict policy as to how a network should handle incoming routes
taggedwith communities. Therefore, there is no consistent behavior
in forwarding BGP communities amongst di￿erent networks; e.g.,
some will remove all communities not understood by them, while
others will forward everything, and yet others have more complex
community propagation policies. We discuss implications of this
design choice in Section 3, and measure the extent of community
propagation in Section 4.
3 BGP COMMUNITIES: CAN OF WORMS
By allowing ASes to extend the semantics of routing updates, BGP
communities can signi￿cantly simplify policy implementation. As
such they are, as we underline in Section 4, heavily used in today’s
routing system. However, as we now show, they also present a can
of worms in the sense of “a situation that causes a lot of problems
for you when you start to deal with it” 2. We, then, discuss why
this is too often the case in today’s Internet.
3.1 Motivating Example Scenario
We use a common community service, AS path prepending, to show
the intended use of communities as well as noting the potential for
abuse, see Figure 2. AS1 announces the pre￿x p to AS2 and on to
AS4, which announces it to AS3 and AS5 and then on to AS6 (see
green hollow arrows). Consider tra￿c from AS6 to p. As the AS
paths via AS3 and AS5 have the same length, AS6 may choose to
route via AS3 (dotted blue line). AS3 o￿ers AS path prepending via
the community AS3:⇥n to prepend n times; where n is typically
between 1 and 3. For example, NTT uses 2914:421 for prepending
once, 2914:422 for prepending twice, etc. The intended use of this
service is to enable AS3’s peers, e.g., AS4, to do tra￿c steering.
However, if some AS on the path, e.g., in this case, AS4, does not
￿lter communities, this service can also be (ab)used by other ASes
on the announcement path. Potential abuses include: AS2 or AS1
setting the community AS3:⇥3 on the announcement of pre￿x p;
2De￿nition of “can of worms” according to Cambridge Advanced Learner’s Dictionary
& Thesaurus.
causing AS3 to path prepend three times for the announcement
of p to AS6. This changes the tra￿c ￿ow from AS6 toward AS1 to
choose the AS5 (shown via the solid blue line) as opposed to AS3.
The motivation for AS2 might be:
Malicious interceptor: If AS5 is a malicious interceptor [22, 57],
AS2 is able to steer tra￿c through it.
Impose additional cost: The link from AS5 to AS4 might be
more expensive than the link between AS3 and AS4. AS2 forces
AS4’s ingress tra￿c to the “expensive link”, that yields high cost
for AS4.
Performance improvement: If the service o￿ered by AS6 is
popular and the performance via AS5 in terms of bandwidth
and/or delay is signi￿cantly better, AS2 may improve its service
to AS1 by tagging the announcement p with the path prepending
community of the provider of its provider, i.e., to steer tra￿c via
AS5 rather than AS3.
Performance impairment: If the performance via AS5 is signif-
icantly worse than the performance via AS3, AS2 may slow down
an application originating in AS6 that is clogging its network.
Because BGP communities are transitive attributes, the above is
fully compliant with the speci￿cation. But the actual behavior/use
depends on the policies of the involved ASes, in particular, AS3 and
AS4.
The above is a teaser example to highlight some potentially unin-
tended consequences of transitive BGP community use. In Section 5
we show multiple scenarios for tra￿c steering as well as remotely
triggered blackholing (dropping of tra￿c). When combined with
pre￿x hijacking [39] this raises signi￿cant security concerns. Thus,
we argue that transitive BGP communities are “a can of worms” for
the routing system.
3.2 BGP Communities Shortcomings
We believe that BGP communities may be an insu￿ciently con-
strained feature for the Internet routing system for the following
reasons.
Missing Semantics: Communities are “just tags.” This has mul-
tiple consequences: (a) Communities do not have a generally
agreed upon semantic. Only a few communities and the “ex-
pected” community format are standardized via RFCs (Section 2).
This is analogous to having a program’s semantics in the com-
ment statements. (b) Communities are AS speci￿c. Each AS can
de￿ne their own communities and determine how to publish
them, e.g., publicly or only to their peers/customers. (c) The
order in which communities are processed by a router is not
well-speci￿ed and di￿ers by operator con￿guration as well as
by equipment vendor.
No authentication of tagger/community: AnyAS on the path
can add or modify any of the communities of a routing update.
The recipient of a community cannot determine which AS on
the path added or modi￿ed any of the communities.
Yet, communities are critical for operation since complex rout-
ing policies are a reality and unlikely to change. Currently, BGP
communities are the most convenient way for signaling informa-
tion between ASes – an essential component for realizing routing
policies. Moreover, an AS may not only mistakenly or maliciously
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Source BGP messages IPv4 pre￿xes IPv6 pre￿xes Collectors IP peers AS peers Communities ASes Origin Transit Stub
(in Billions)
RIS 4.80 823,619 76,783 13 275 268 53,208 62,210 61,806 15,016 47,194
RV 9.12 874,054 65,812 15 357 206 57,344 62,424 62,020 9,418 50,991
IS 23.48 830,527 63,584 4 154 97 50,128 62,153 61,754 11,067 51,086
PCH 1.57 802,637 64,136 162 4,640 1,924 40,719 62,033 61,620 10,914 51,119
Total 38.98 967,499 84,953 194 5,158 2,133 63,797 62,681 62,253 15,578 47,103
Table 1: Overview of BGP dataset (April 2018). IPv4 pre￿xes contributed 92% to the total number of pre￿xes while IPv6 con-
tributes 8%. Therefore, we focus on IPv4 for all other statistics.
tag a route with a community, it may even free-ride, i.e., hijack a
pre￿x or subpre￿x3 by announcing them tagged with a community
of their choice.
Given the above, one has to ask what this implies for the Internet
routing system. First, each AS should de￿ne its policy in regard
to remote community use and/or install appropriate ￿lters and
community parsers. Second, policy implementation should account
for ill-speci￿ed and misused communities. Misuse of communities
can either happen due to malicious intent or by mistake, e.g., due
to fat or thin ￿ngers. Indeed, when considering the above short-
comings, together with the scenarios highlighted in Section 5, we
urge the community to rethink whether communities are the right
mechanism and, if so, how to ameliorate the above shortcomings.
3.3 Terminology
In the rest of the paper we use the following terminology:
Attackee: The attackee in our context is theASwhose pre￿x/tra￿c
is a￿ected by manipulating the community attribute of an up-
date.
Attacker: The attacker is the AS which is manipulating the com-
munity attribute of an update or announcing a hijacked (sub-)
pre￿x.
Community target: The AS whose community service is used
to change the route or tra￿c ￿ow. We sometimes also refer to
this AS as the community provider.
Thus, in Figure 2 AS3 is the community target, AS2 is the attacker
and depending on AS2’s motivation the attackee is AS4 or AS1.
4 BGP COMMUNITIES PROPAGATION
According to RFC1997 [25] BGP communities are an optional tran-
sitive attribute. Yet, their expected use is often between two AS
neighbors. In this section, we tackle this apparent contradiction.
First, we measure how common BGP communities use is. Then, we
show how often communities are propagated beyond a single hop,
i.e., are transitive, or if they even on the AS path. Finally, we check
for indications that ASes actively strip communities.
4.1 Datasets
We rely on a multitude of vantage points within the Internet routing
system.
3Hijacking a route corresponds to announcing a pre￿x for which the AS is not respon-
sible for.
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BGP routing tables and updates: We rely on the widely-used
public datasets of the route collectors from (i) RIPE NCC Routing
Information Service (RIS) [17], (ii) University of Oregon Route
Views (RV) [18], (iii) Isolario project (IS) [9], and (iv) Packet
Clearing House (PCH) [13]. Each of these platforms consists of
multiple routers which collect BGP updates from many BGP
peers. Some BGP peers send full routing tables, others partial
views, and even others only their customer routes. We use the
data for the month of April 2018. We remove AS path prepending
to not bias the AS path. For an overview see Table 1. One specialty
of the PCH platform is that it maintains route collectors that
peer with the route servers at about 180 di￿erent IXPs around
the Globe (ca. April 2018) [12]. Route servers are typically a
value-added service of the IXP that collect routing information
in a centralized manner and redistribute it to connected member
routers. Thus, PCH o￿ers BGP routing information for most of
the IXP members [52].
Looking Glasses: We use looking glasses of certain ASes, when
available, to con￿rm (i) community availability and propagation,
(ii) route changes, as well as (iii) reachability of pre￿xes.
Active Measurements: We use the RIPE Atlas platform [16] to
ping and traceroute to multiple targets during and after routing
experiments. RIPE Atlas is an open distributed Internet mea-
surement platform with roughly 10K active measurement nodes.
When studying tra￿c shifting and/or dropping attacks, we use
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Figure 4: BGP communities use as observed in the collectors
of our study.
traceroutes along the expected and the altered path to ensure
the e￿ect of the routing attack on the data plane.
4.2 BGP Communities Use: A ￿rst look
As a ￿rst step, we measure how wide-spread community use is.
Overall, our results validate previous observations [28, 29, 34, 36]
that it has increased signi￿cantly over the last ￿ve years, see Fig-
ure 3. Indeed, today more than 5K ASes o￿er community-based
services4 and we observe more than 63K di￿erent communities in
our dataset from April 2018. This is an increase of 18% over 2017.
Overall, we ￿nd that more than 75% of all BGP announcements
at the more than 190 BGP collectors have at least one community
set. This means that we can indeed use these collectors to study
community use and propagation. Interestingly, some collectors ob-
serve more communities than others. Figure 4(a) shows for each
BGP collector the fraction of their updates which have at least
one community set (in increasing order for each of the four plat-
forms). A large number of our observation points allow us to study
community propagation.
We also measure the number of distinct ASes for which we see
communities at each BGP collector, see Table 2. We see more than
60K unique communities from more than 5.6K ASes which are not
4This statistic is computed under the assumption that communities follow the format
convention, namely, AS:value.
Source Total# of ASes
w/o
collector
peer
on-path o￿-path o￿-pathw/o private
RIS 4,931 4,925 3,647 1,826 1,480
RV 5,383 5,375 3,510 1,668 1,279
IS 4,728 4,723 3,513 1,757 1,420
PCH 4,170 4,118 3,002 1,585 1,259
Total 5,659 5,630 3,958 2,154 1,721
Table 2: Summary of ASes with observed BGP communities.
directly peering with the respective BGP collector. This suggests
that communities are propagated beyond direct BGP neighbors; or
one would only see communities associated with direct BGP-peers
of the collector.
Next, wemeasure the number of communities per BGP announce-
ment, see Figure 4(b). Recall, 75% carry at least one BGP community.
Moreover, 51% have more than two communities set and 0.06% have
more than 50 communities set (blue dots). These communities are
often (41%) associated with more than a single AS (orange triangle).
This is yet another signal that communities are indeed transitive.
4.3 BGP Communities Propagation Properties
Next, we measure how far communities propagate. We rely on
the format convention, i.e.: AS:value. Consider a BGP update for
pre￿x p originated at AS1 and observed at AS5 with AS path AS5
AS4 AS3 AS2 AS1. Assume that the update is tagged with AS1:X
and AS3:Y. We assume that AS1 tagged the route with community
AS1:X since it is the origin AS. The second community is tagged
with AS3 and can be either a community received by AS3 from
AS2 on ingress or set by AS3 on egress towards AS4. To estimate
how far communities propagate we conservatively assume that the
route is tagged with the community AS3:Y by AS3 rather than by
AS2.
However, there is a signi￿cant number (21K) of communities of
the form ASX:Y where ASX is not on the AS path. We call these
communities “o￿-path” and the others “on-path”. The former can
occur, e.g., at an IXP where the IXP’s AS provides the service sig-
naled by the community but, by convention, IXPs are not on the
AS path. Other reasons involve widespread tagging (community
bundling) to simplify con￿guration, see, e.g., as reported by Giotsas
et al. [36]. Overall, see Table 2, we ￿nd that 4K ASes are encoded in
the on-path communities and 2K in o￿-path communities. Among
the o￿-path communities there are roughly 400 private ASes [49].
Private ASes are per se o￿-path as they are not routed. They are
often used by networks with large AS numbers which do not ￿t into
the 32-bit community format. Thus, we focus on the communities
with public AS numbers.
For on-path communities Figure 5(a) shows an ECDF of the num-
ber of AS hops that each community is relayed along the AS path.
The red triangles represent the all BGP communities we observed.
We ￿nd that a signi￿cant number of communities are propagated
multiple hops. Almost 50% of the communities travel more than
four hops (the mean hop length of all announcements [51]). The
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Figure 5: BGP communities propagation properties.
maximum hop distance we observed is 11 which, given the highly
connected AS graph, is rather large.
To check if speci￿c classes of communities are more likely to be
propagated we consider blackholing communities as a case study.
Hereby, we identify blackholing communities either by the value
666 as de￿ned in RFC7999 [47] or based on the list of veri￿ed and
inferred blackholing communities from previous work [36]. The
resulting ECDF is shown by the purple squares in Figure 5(a). The
di￿erence between the two ECDFs clearly shows that blackholing
communities do not travel (on average) as far as other BGP commu-
nities. Around 50% of the blackholing communities travel only up to
two AS hops, about 80% travel up to four. This is a clear indication
that blackholing communities are treated di￿erently by network
operators. On the other hand, we still observe some blackholing
communities with large hop counts – up to 11.
To check to which extent the above observations are biased by
the AS-path length, Figure 5(b) shows the ECDF of the number
AS edges that each community is relayed on for di￿erent AS path
lengths. Hereby, we do not consider communities of the monitor
AS but do include the edge to the monitor. The color gradient
corresponds to the respective AS path length—light green for path
length of three up to dark blue with a path length of 10 ASes.
This plot highlights that a signi￿cant number of the communities
travel more than 50% of the AS-path distance. However, as the path
length increases the fraction of the communities that travel longer
distances decreases somewhat. The reason for is that each AS on
the path can add communities. Therefore, the expected number of
communities that can only travel some portion of the AS path is
higher. Thus, the plot highlights that communities are propagated
signi￿cant distances in the Internet independent of the AS path
length.
Using the same data we measure how many ASes propagate
communities, i.e., are transitive for at least one BGP community
of another AS. We do not include the ASes that directly peer with
the collector5. Thus, for AS2 to be considered transitive we require
at least one BGP update for a pre￿x p tagged with a community
AS1:X on a path AS3 AS2 AS1. We ￿nd that there are 2.2K transit
5The con￿guration for these peerings is often collector speci￿c and may di￿er from
the “regular” policy of the AS.
ASes6 that relay communities relative to a total of 15.5K transit
ASes in our dataset.
Next, we explore popular values involved in the observed com-
munities and how these di￿er for o￿- vs. on-path communities.
Overall, we ￿nd that the tails are extremely long—a consequence
of the non-standardization of communities. Figure 5(c) shows a
histogram of the top-10 most popular values for both o￿- and on-
path communities. Each bar is annotated with the corresponding
community values. Note, that their individual contribution is rather
small and that they di￿er signi￿cantly. Among the most popular
o￿-path communities is 666 which is used for blackholing. For
on-path 666 is not among the top-10 community values. Rather,
it is far down in the tail. One explanation is that it is often not
observable for on-path since the respective AS should have acted
upon receiving the blackhole community. For o￿-path we see more
announcements with blackholing as they are often applied on all
peering sessions rather than only selectively [36]. The other values
look like convenient values, e.g., for local pref with 100, 200, and
1000.
4.4 BGP Communities Filters
So far we focused on how common communities are and if they are
forwarded. We have yet to measure if ASes only selectively forward
communities or if they actively ￿lter them. As there is no best
practice on how to handle communities, networks may ￿lter out all,
none, or just speci￿c ones. Measuring this is not straightforward
as the only indication of ￿ltering (resp. selective forwarding) is the
lack of community propagation as seen in the BGP data. Further
compounding the measurement di￿culty are that (a) any AS on
the path may remove a community, and (b) an AS may receive a
“better route” (in the sense of BGP best path selection) not tagged
with the community.
We nevertheless try to identify BGP neighbors where commu-
nities are not propagated by collecting indication counts for each
directed AS pair. We iterate through all pre￿xes and, for each pre￿x
p, we consider all updates at the same time and look for ASes where
a community that has already been forwarded is propagated to one
peer but not to another. The latter is an indication of ￿ltering or
6We consider an AS a transit AS if there is at least one AS path in which it is neither
the origin nor the collector.
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Figure 6: Community forwarding behavior.
selective forwarding. The former is an indication of forwarding,
i.e., no ￿ltering.
To make this more concrete consider the example shown in Fig-
ure 6(a). We ￿nd two announcementsA1,A2 for pre￿x p originating
in AS1 in the bgpdumps of BGP collectors in AS4 and AS5. An-
nouncementA1 contains AS-Path AS1, AS2, AS3, AS4 and carries
a community AS2:X, while A2 has AS-Path AS1, AS2, AS3, AS5
and carries no communities at all. For this analysis we assume the
community was not added earlier than AS2. Thus we increase the
community-added indication on the edge (AS2, AS3).
Here, A1 serves as an indication that AS3 transitively forwards
the community from AS2 onwards. Therefore, we increase the
community-forwarded indication count for the AS pair (AS3, AS4).
A2 allows us to increase the community-￿ltered indication count
of AS pair (AS3, AS5). We know from A1 that for this pre￿x the
community AS2:X is forwarded to AS3 and that AS3 forwards it to
some other peers; but we do not see it on the edge (AS3, AS5).
We ￿nd signs of transitive forwarding of communities for 4% of
the almost 400,000 AS edges and for ￿ltering for roughly 10%. These
numbers increase to 6% resp. 15% if we consider AS edges with at
least 100 AS paths. We acknowledge that the results of the above
heuristic are biased by the BGP collectors which give us di￿erent
degrees of visibility of the AS edges, as well as by the number of
paths observed within the observation period. However, since we
consider a full month of BGP updates from four di￿erent collector
platforms we have reasonable coverage of the AS graph.
Figure 6(b) shows a scatter plot on log-log axis (to the base of
10)7 of the ￿ltering vs. non-￿ltering indicators per AS edge. We only
include AS edges with at least 100 BGP paths and where we can
￿nd either an indication for or against ￿ltering. The count values
per AS edge range from 0 to 98 million (thus, the values on the x-
and y-axis) which comes from the number of di￿erent communities
and paths that are used in the ￿lter indication computation. The
color of the hex-bins correspond to the number of AS edges (darker
color indicates more AS edges).
For some AS edges, we ￿nd indications that they strip all com-
munities. Those are the ones on the bottom. For others, on the
left hand side, we see no indication of ￿ltering, i.e., they forward
all communities without touching them. Naturally, we have also
many AS edges in the middle of the plot, where we have mixed
indications: some communities are forwarded and some are ￿ltered.
The explanation for this mixed picture lies in the absence of best
practices regarding BGP communities. After inquiring within the
operator community, we found that nearly everyone has a di￿erent
view on this—some remove all communities, some do not tamper
with them at all, while others act upon and remove communities
directed at them and leave the rest in place. On the other hand,
there are operational reasons to only forward some communities
to some BGP neighbors, e.g., di￿erent handling of customers and
peers.
One natural question in this context is if the relationship type of
an AS edge has any in￿uence on ￿ltering. To check this we use the
CAIDAAS relationship dataset [2] to distinguish between customer-
provider, provider-customer, and peering edges. However, we ￿nd
that this classi￿cation is too coarse grained to allow for a conclusive
picture regarding handling of communities. Thus, we plan in future
work to correlate ￿ltering/non-￿ltering of communities with the
role of an AS in the Internet topology.
5 UNHAPPY SCENARIOS
In this section, we highlight di￿erent scenarios where transitive
community propagation can enable unintended results, including
remotely triggered blackholing, tra￿c steering, and route manipu-
lation.
5.1 Remotely Triggered Blackholing
High-volume DDoS network attacks can heavily degrade network
performance even to the point of making services unavailable [21,
32]. Especially edge networks often su￿er as they cannot handle
such high tra￿c levels. One mitigation option is blackholing, i.e.,
dropping all tra￿c going to a destination under attack, ideally, as
close to the source as possible. As result, the victim IP address or the
entire pre￿x becomes intentionally unreachable. Many networks
provide their customers with the ability to automatically blackhole
tra￿c using BGP communities as a signaling mechanism, so-called
“remotely triggered blackholing” (RTBH) [47]. Networks issue black-
holing requests by sending BGP announcements to their direct BGP
neighbors for speci￿c destination pre￿xes with the blackholing
community of the respective network. The neighbor, upon receiv-
ing such an announcement discards, at its ingress, tra￿c whose
7The plot uses a logarithmic x- and y-axis. To include zero values we plot the logarithms
of the (values + 1).
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Figure 8: Tra￿c steering.
destination address is in the blackholed pre￿x. In principle, this
service should only be used in case of attack and by networks which
actually have authority for the blackholed pre￿x or IP address.
However, consider the example shown in Figure 7(a). Here, AS1
announces pre￿x p to both AS2 and AS3. AS3 o￿ers blackholing
service and is the community target in this scenario. If AS2, the
attacker, adds the blackhole tagged for AS3 to its announcement
for p to AS3, tra￿c to p may be blackholed at AS3 even though the
AS path of the tagged route is longer. The reason is often preferred
treatment of the blackhole community before best path selection,
see, e.g., the suggested con￿guration in [27]. Alternatively,AS2, the
attacker, may announce a more speci￿c of p which again has higher
priority than the direct announcement fromAS1, the attackee. Note,
if AS4 also o￿ers blackholing services via communities the same
attack can be launched with AS4 as community target as long as
AS3 propagates communities.
The above example requires the attacker, AS2, to be on a path
from AS1 to AS3. However, even if this is not the case AS2 may be
able to hijack pre￿x p, especially if AS2 and AS3 are peering, since
strict pre￿x validation is often not in place, see Figure 7(b). Indeed,
[53] reports 5,295 routing attacks (route leaks and hijacks) alone in
2017 which arguably should not be so frequent if proper ￿ltering
would be in place.
Even when pre￿x validation is in place, it may be possible to
hijack pre￿xes, by tagging them with a blackhole community, de-
pending on the order in which announcements are processed by
a router’s ￿lters. For example, there are con￿gurations, e.g., [56],
where instead of discarding the announcement (due to hijacking)
the router might process the hijacked announcement if tagged
with the blackhole community as the community raises the routes
precedence.
If AS2 has the ability to hijack pre￿x p of the attackee (AS1), it
can announce p with a short AS path tagged with the blackhole
community of AS3. This causes AS3, the community target, to drop
all tra￿c to p. Again, a similar scenario is possible with AS4 as
community target if AS3 propagates AS4s blackholing communities.
Note, such an attack may be more or less interesting than simply
hijacking. First, it may be e￿ective only because of the community
tag (validation done after blackholing). Second, whereas hijack-
ing may only partially disrupt tra￿c (to the poisoned ASes), the
hijacking plus blackholing attack disrupts all tra￿c to the victim.
5.2 Tra￿c Steering
Tra￿c engineering is one of the essential tasks of a network opera-
tor. The generally preferred choice for an AS is selective announce-
ment of pre￿xes. Sometimes, this is not desired or not su￿cient. A
common alternative is for remote ASes to provide AS path prepend-
ing, Local Preference tuning, Multiple Exit Discriminator (MED)
tuning, or partial route announcements, e.g., in speci￿c regions
such as Europe only, US only, Asia only. Many ASes accept signals
for these tunings via BGP communities; and many ASes are o￿ering
these tra￿c steering services to their customers.
Recall the example from Figure 2 in Section 3. It highlights that
it is possible to intentionally or unintentionally steer tra￿c over a
link that should not be used according to the AS’s policy. Indeed,
if the involved ASes are susceptible to pre￿x hijacking this can
be further misused as shown in Figure 8. An attacker AS may
hijack pre￿x p (which AS1 receives from a peer) and tag it with the
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Figure 9: Route manipulation at an IXP with hijacking.
prepending community, thus, rerouting tra￿c via AS58. This can
cause trouble for AS1, either due to the unintentional heavy use of
the link between AS1 and AS5, e.g., a paid peering link, or if AS2
and AS5 collaborate and AS5 has a malicious tra￿c tap to inspect
all tra￿c to p.
The next example, see Figure 8(b), shows how AS2, the attacker,
can use the local pref communities of AS1 to force AS1 to route all
its tra￿c to AS2 over a single link via AS4 to AS1. While this may
look undesirable at ￿rst, this can be highly bene￿cial for AS2, e.g.,
if R2 is in Hong Kong and the origin of p is in the US. AS2 in e￿ect
forces AS1 to pay for expensive intercontinental transport. In this
case, the local pref community can be used to declare the undesired
path (from the view of AS2) a backup path. We leave the decision
on whether this is an attack or a smart way of reducing cost to the
informed reader.
5.3 Route Manipulation
Using communities it is not only possible to cause blackholing or
change tra￿c paths; but it is also possible to manipulate routes. In
particular, Figure 9 shows how this can be done at an IXP. IXPs
often o￿er community services via their route servers as value
added service to customers. One popular service is the ability to
tag routes with communities to signal to which peer a route should
be advertised, e.g., the community IXP:AS4 is used to selectively
advertise a route to IXP member AS4. Thus, if AS1 sends the route
with this pre￿x it can expect to receive tra￿c for p via the IXP for
AS4. Now, if an attacker, AS2, uses another community service of
the IXP, namely a community to signal that a pre￿x should not be
advertised to a peer, e.g., using the community 0:AS4, there is a
con￿ict. This con￿ict is resolved at the route server by applying the
rules for community-based services in a speci￿c order. For some
IXPs this order as well as their route server con￿guration is publicly
available. We checked that at least for one IXP communities that are
used to “not advertise a pre￿x to a peer AS” are handled before those
that are used to “advertise to peer AS”. This causes the attacker of
Figure 9 to succeed in not advertising a route for pre￿x p to AS4.
8Even though AS2 announces a route for p it may not receive much if any tra￿c if
the best route on most routers remains the one to the origin AS for p . If AS2 receives
any tra￿c for p it can loop it back to AS1.
5.4 Summary
Thus, we conclude that communities add even more worms to the
routing can. To check their realizability we review the above scenar-
ios and identify the following necessary and su￿cient conditions:
Necessary condition: The above weaknesses of remotely trig-
gered community actions can, in principle, be used if communities
are propagated beyond a single AS and if the community service
is known.
Su￿cient condition: For the above weaknesses to be triggered
a su￿cient condition is that the attacker is able to advertise BGP
pre￿xes with the appropriate communities, respectively hijack
community tagged pre￿xes. Note, the propagation has to hold
for all ASes on the path from the attacker to the community
target.
We ￿nd, see Section 4, that the necessary conditions exist in the
wild since communities are commonly propagated beyond their
direct neighbors. Thus, we next identify su￿cient conditions for
each scenario by ￿rst setting up a controlled experiment in the lab and
then showcasing at least one instance of each scenario in a controlled
experiment in the real Internet. Hereby, we explicitly address ethical
consideration, see Section 7.1.
6 TESTING THE FEASIBILITY
To better understand the feasibility of BGP community manipu-
lation, and to expose nuances in their practical application and
implementation, we performed a series of experiments within a
controlled testbed. We experimented using Cisco 7200 routers run-
ning IOS 15.2(4)S7 (released in 2015) and Juniper routers running
JunOS 12.1R1.9 (released in 2012). While this router hardware and
software may not re￿ect the hardware currently deployed in the In-
ternet, routers from these two vendors are heavily deployed. Thus,
experiments with these two vendors can help shed light on what
we might expect in the wild.
In the lab, we con￿gured each of the scenarios from Section 5,
relying on available vendor documentation, e.g., [27] and pub-
lic documentation on community best practices, e.g., [56]. For
reproducible, we make our con￿gurations publicly available at
https://www.cmand.org/caas/.
In addition to verifying necessary conditions for multi-hop com-
munity propagation, the laboratory experiments allow us to identify
su￿cient conditions for each scenario. We summarize our ￿ndings
along three lines of insights, namely, i) propagation; ii) exploitation;
and iii) miscon￿guration.
6.1 Community Propagation
A cornerstone of our investigation is the necessary condition that a
network path propagates BGP communities. As shown in Section 4,
this condition frequently holds in practice; our controlled experi-
ments help explain why some paths propagate communities while
others do not.
Default behavior: While both Cisco and Juniper accept BGP
updates with communities attributes by default, only Juniper
propagates them by default. Cisco requires explicit per-peer or
group con￿guration; a behavior that persists in both legacy and
modern Cisco IOS implementations, including IOS XE. However,
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since communities are often used to implement basic services one
can expect that, even on Cisco routers, community propagation
is typically enabled.
Adding communities: Both Cisco and JunOS provide con￿g-
uration to add, subtract, or set communities to in-bound and
out-bound pre￿xes. More complex behaviors are possible with
regular expressions. In lieu of complex logic or error-prone ex-
pressions, we conjecture that some of the instances of community
propagation we observe are due to simple and expedient con￿g-
urations that use additive behavior for unknown communities.
Number of communities: Adding communitiesmay comewith
the danger of exceeding the maximum number of communities
per pre￿x. However, this is unlikely for the following reason: the
BGP communities attribute is 4 bytes while the attribute length
￿eld is 2 bytes. Thus, a BGP update can carry up to 216/24 = 16K
communities. Yet, Cisco only permits adding 32 distinct com-
munities to a pre￿x, in addition to the communities the pre￿x
arrived with. So, there is little risk in using the additive com-
munity propagation strategy, and no speci￿c need to limit the
number of communities carried in an announcement because
most advertisements cross fewer than ten ASes [51].
6.2 Requirements for Exploitation
To exploit BGP communities we require the ability to trigger the
community-based services. This is limited by which communities
propagate along which route, as well as how routers resolve con-
￿icting paths.
Community propagation: If a BGP router receives multiple
routes to the same pre￿x with di￿erent communities, the ones
of the best path are the only ones propagated. Thus, any at-
tack needing to propagate a speci￿c community from A to B
must not only meet the necessary condition of A not stripping
communities, but must also be chosen byA as the best BGP path.
Best route selection: A target that implements policies based
on communities may receive announcements for the same pre￿x
from two di￿erent peers. If only one of the announcements
carries a community, BGP follows its standard route preference
algorithm (e.g., shortest AS_PATH). However, implementations
of RTBH may alter this preference (by setting a higher local
preference).
6.3 Potential to Exploit
Third, it is well-known that production router con￿gurations are
complex and hard to validate [31]. We experienced, and thus ex-
pect, communities to further increase con￿guration complexity and,
therefore, contribute to the potential success of BGP community
misuse.
For example: Both Cisco and Juniper normalize communities
within their con￿gurations, when displaying BGP pre￿xes, and
when sending BGP messages—by numerically sorting them. How-
ever, the order in which communities are evaluated depends on
the con￿guration. Rules are evaluated in a speci￿ed order that is
independent of the community value (and, indeed, non-community
based rules may be preceded or followed by community rules). The
di￿culty of ensuring the correctness of such con￿gurations, espe-
cially as a network grows and becomes more complex, is non-trivial.
For example, we note that even simple con￿gurations can exhibit
unintended behaviors such as the snippet of Cisco router con￿gu-
ration that appeared in a NANOG tutorial on RTBH [56]. Here, the
intent is to prevent hijacking by validating BGP announcements
against a list of accepted customer pre￿xes. However, the route-
map checks whether the pre￿x carries the blackhole community
before performing the validation, thereby enabling hijacking-based
attacks.
7 EXPERIMENTS IN THEWILD
To assess the real-world feasibility of the aforementioned scenarios
(Section 5), we perform a number of experiments on the live Inter-
net. Overall, we realize most of the scenarios in practice and gained
a deep understanding of the requirements for, and di￿culty of, suc-
cessful attacks. For validation, we used a combination of (i) public
BGP looking glasses [33]; and (ii) RIPE Atlas active probes [16].
Table 3 summarizes our major ￿ndings.
7.1 Ethical Considerations
Due to the inherently disruptive nature of the scenarios, we ensured
prior coordination with, and permission of, the ASes and networks
involved. To avoid the potential for collateral damage, the addresses
and pre￿xes we use belong to networks that explicitly gave us
permission to use as part of our experiments, even for hijacking-
based attacks9.
Our goal is to demonstrate that the weaknesses we identify are
not merely theoretical, but present in the wild. For this, individual
examples derived from our network partners su￿ce – we explic-
itly do not perform active Internet-wide experiments to assess the
overall vulnerability, as doing so would pose undue operational
and ethical risk.
We coordinate with the operators of three networks to target
them as attackees and, respectively, target pre￿xes that were given
to us as targets. We use two networks as attackers, i.e., pre￿x injec-
tion points, that were under our control: (i) the PEERING experi-
mental platform [15, 54], and (ii) an experimental research network.
Each of these points has its own ASN and can set arbitrary com-
munities on announcements. We strictly follow the Acceptable Use
Policy (AUP) [14] of PEERING and the research network; in partic-
ular, we only announce pre￿xes we control and with the correct
respective origin ASN (i.e., no hijacking from PEERING).
7.2 Propagation Checking
To direct our in vivo experiments – again in consideration of both
risk minimization and feasibility – we ￿rst infer community propa-
gation behavior along the path from the attacker to the target using
a benign community. We advertise a pre￿x tagged with the benign
community from both of our injection platforms: PEERING and the
research network. This benign community sets the high-order bits
to the ASN of our injection point, and uses low-order bits that we
have not observed in the wild. Our intent is to observe whether
ASes propagate unknown communities, rather than to trigger any
particular action.
9Therefore, in some sense, these are not true hijacks as we had permission to send the
announcements from this origin.
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We announce this pre￿x via a single physical location of the re-
search network with two upstream providers. We ￿nd that only one
of the upstream providers propagates communities. As observed
at the route collectors, we see that seven transit providers further
propagate the pre￿x with the community intact.
In contrast, the PEERING platform peers with hundreds of net-
works (via route servers at ten di￿erent points of presence), many
of which propagate communities. Thus, it provides better visibility
into the community propagation across a large number of paths,
as observed at the route collectors. Across all of our available BGP
views, we see more than 50 transit providers forwarding the pre￿x
with the community within ⇠30 minutes of the initial announce-
ment. Within a day, more than 112 transit providers (out of the 434
transit and origin ASes in the paths, as observed by the collectors
in this study) were seen to propagate the pre￿x’s community.
7.3 Remotely Triggered Blackholing
Informed by the benign community propagation inference, we ￿nd a provider
that is two AS hops away from our injection point. While the benign com-
munity propagates to many ASes, we select a provider that both supports
RTBH and o￿ers a public looking glass. Because the target AS is not a direct
peer of the attacker, this attack exploits the necessary conditions discussed
previously.
Experiment: Using the target’s blackhole community, we announce a
/24 sub-pre￿x of our allocation (non-hijack). Next, we announce a /24
from a block of address space we had permission to hijack. Because of
protections in place by the research network and its provider, the hijack
based attack required updating the IRR [8]. While IRR validation adds a
layer of defense for the hijack version of this attack, we note that many
other injection points do not validate and, even when they do, it is often
easy to circumvent [20, 58].
Validation: We examine the two pre￿xes (hijacked and non-hijacked)
using the target’s looking glass, before and after these announcements,
as well as by sending active data plane probes using Atlas before and
after (we ensure that the pre￿x contains an address that is responsive to
ICMP echo requests). Further, the immediate upstream of our injection
point provides a public looking glass enabling us to check community
propagation. For all RTBH experiments, we saw that the pre￿x and
community was accepted (target’s looking glass). Further, we observed
that the next-hop address for the pre￿x changed to a null interface
address as result to the blackhole community. At this point, the target
pre￿x was no longer reachable via the data plane tested using Atlas
probes.
Additional constraints: To manage routing table growth and fragmen-
tation, many providers enforce a limit on the maximum pre￿x mask
length of announcements they will accept. In contrast, blackhole an-
nouncements typically must be for a /24 or more speci￿c pre￿x. Some
networks only accept blackhole announcements for a single host (a /32
pre￿x). Thus, an intermediate AS along the blackhole attack path must
accept and propagate small pre￿xes if it is not aware of the target’s
blackhole community.
Summary: RTBH is the easiest scenario to realize in the wild, indepen-
dent of hijacking. Unlike other attacks, we ￿nd that pre￿xes with black-
hole communities are accepted independent of AS relationships, and are
generally preferred even when the attacking AS path is longer.
At ￿rst blush, blackholing in conjunction with hijacking may seem
redundant as they both impact reachability to the attackee’s address space.
However, an important distinction is that hijacking only poisons those ASes
near the attacker, whereas a hijack-based blackholing attack drops tra￿c at
the destination AS, thereby denying service universally.
7.4 Tra￿c Steering
Again, we leverage community propagation paths to identify potential
targets for tra￿c steering attacks. An initially unexpected impediment is
the role AS relationships play in tra￿c steering, as discussed below. We,
therefore, relied on PEERING.We found a community propagating path from
PEERING, through an intermediate provider, to a target AS that implements
community-based steering. Since the intermediate provider is a customer
of the target AS, the target AS accepts and acts upon the communities.
Experiment: Using the PEERING testbed, we advertise a pre￿x allocated
to our experiment tagged ￿rst with the target’s community to prepend
the target’s AS twice, and then with the target’s community to lower
the local preference to a value de￿ned to be “customer fallback.”
Validation: We primarily relied on looking glasses along the attack path,
as well as public route collectors, to verify the steering attacks. Using
the looking glass, we veri￿ed that the path prepending community was
present at the target.We examined the pre￿xwithin public route collector
views both before and during the attack, and veri￿ed that not only did
the AS path change for many of the best paths received from peers, but
also that the best path for many peers contained AS prepending for the
target. Because of di￿culties in ￿nding an active Atlas monitor that uses
the target AS as the best path toward our pre￿x, we relied on the looking
glass within the target to verify the e￿ect of the local pref community.
Prior to the attack, we observed the pre￿x in the looking glass with the
provider’s default local preference, whereas during the attack we see it
with the requested lower preference.
Additional constraints: Because of the AUP limitations on PEERING,
we only implement the non-hijacking based multi-hop steering attack.
Mounting the hijacking-based steering attack from the research network
only successfully in￿uenced the direct upstream. This limitation is largely
due to our experimental environment, but does illustrate complications
with steering attacks. While we veri￿ed the ability to prepend the AS
path and local preference of our pre￿x within the immediate upstream
provider of the research network injection point, we did not trigger
similar behavior within an AS that was two hops away. The reason is that
business relationships, either customer, provider, or peer, impact whether
these communities are accepted and acted upon in practice (even when
they propagate). Providers typically have di￿erent policies depending on
the relationship type, and often only act on tra￿c steering communities
that arrive from a BGP customer (operators maintain customer groups in
their con￿guration ￿les). Because the research network is a customer
of a top-tier network that is not a customer of any other AS, we did
not perform the multi-AS hop tra￿c steering attack from this injection
point.
Summary: Access to multiple injection points is highly bene￿cial to
orchestrate tra￿c steering attacks, and stub networks are preferred. On
the other hand, given the ￿attening of the Internet hierarchy, in many
cases, multiple levels of upstreams is no longer common. Thus, these
types of attacks may be hard to launch.
7.5 Route Manipulation
To explore route manipulation, we utilize a well-known exchange point’s
route server that uses communities to control route redistribution. Not
only does PEERING connect to this route server, it also provides a public
per-peer view of the accepted pre￿xes and communities. This route server
is a particularly attractive target as it publicly documents its community
evaluation order and route server con￿gurations – a policy common among
neutral IXPs for transparency [1, 5, 19].
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Table 3: Summary of our insights from our attacks in the wild.
Scenario Hijack Insights gained from running experiments in the wild Di￿culty
Blackholing no Allowed pre￿x length is checked; activation of RTBH service is typically required. easyyes Allowed pre￿x length is checked; origin validation was not always checked, thus the attack was
easier.
easy
Tra￿c Steering
with local pref
no The business relationship of the attacker with the attackee or transit networks is checked – the
￿attening of the Internet makes this attacks hard to launch (providers only act on communities
set by their customers).
hard
yes The business relationship of the attacker with the attackee or transit networks is checked – the
￿attening of the Internet makes this attacks hard to launch (providers only act on communities
set by their customers); IRR records for origin validation are typically checked, but the check can
be circumvented.
hard
Tra￿c Steering
with path prepending
no The business relationship of the attacker with the attackee or transit networks is typically checked
– the ￿attening of the Internet makes this attacks hard to launch (providers only act on communities
set by their customers); AS path prepending has typically low evaluation order, thus the attack
may not be successful.
hard
yes The business relationship of the attacker with the attackee or transit networks is typically checked
– the ￿attening of the Internet makes this attacks hard to launch (providers only act on communities
set by their customers); IRR records for origin validation are typically checked, but the check can
be circumvented; AS path prepending has typically low evaluation order, thus the attack may not
be successful.
hard
Route Manipulation no Requires inference of community evaluation order when this information is not public. mediumyes Requires inference of community evaluation order when this information is not public; IRR records
for origin validation are typically checked, but the check can be circumvented.
medium
Experiment: From PEERING, we ￿rst sent our pre￿x with a community
that instructs the route server to redistribute the route to a particular
attackee AS. We then sent the pre￿x with this community and a com-
munity that suppresses advertisement to the attackee AS. Because these
communities con￿ict, the resulting behavior exposes the route server
con￿guration.
Validation: We utilize the looking glass of the attackee to determine
whether or not the pre￿x was redistributed by the route server. Prior to
sending the con￿icting communities, we observe the announcement at
the route server, whereas during the attack it is not present.
Summary: While we originated and tagged a pre￿x using an injection
point that is a direct peer of the target route server, this is not a funda-
mental limitation. However, it does demonstrate that an intermediate
provider, upon observing a community for the route server, can add a
con￿icting community to exploit the evaluation order in a similar fash-
ion. Furthermore, because this route server has hundreds of peers, the
potential impact can be large.
7.6 Applicability in the Wild
To obtain a more complete understanding of the real-world potential to
mount remote community-based blackholing attacks, we conduct an au-
tomated experiment that explores the impact of each of the 307 veri￿ed
blackhole communities identi￿ed in [36]. We employ the PEERING testbed
to advertise a /24 pre￿x assigned to us (p), and RIPE Atlas to send active
probes to this pre￿x between August 28 and September 1, 2018.
Speci￿cally, for each community c in the set of blackhole communities,
we: 1) advertise p without communities; 2) issue Atlas ICMP probes from
200 vantage points toward p ; 3) advertise p with community c ; 4) re-issue
the same Atlas ICMP probes. Between each step, we wait ￿ve minutes to
allow routing to converge, and for the Atlas probe requests to ￿nish. The
set of 200 Atlas vantage points is randomly chosen, but constant across all
measurements. We then fetch the probing results and compare responses on
a per-vantage point basis. We ￿nd 25 distinct communities (8.1%) that induce
at least one vantage point to be fully responsive prior to advertising the
community and then unresponsive once c is attached to the advertisement.
These 25 communities a￿ect a total of 48 (24%) of the vantage points.
To con￿rm that the community is the cause of the dropped Atlas probes,
rather than some transient network event, we re-ran the experiment two
days later. The results from this second round of probing exactly matched
the ￿rst – suggesting that the root cause of the behavior we observe is
indeed due to the blackhole communities being accepted and acted upon by
various ASes along the path.
Finally, we issue traceroutes from all of the Atlas vantage points to
our pre￿x p and use a current routeview routing table to naïvely map
router interfaces to AS numbers. We then determine a lower-bound on
the number of AS hops that the blackhole community traverses by ￿nding
the community’s target AS in the path. 13 of 74 community-path pairs
receive the blackhole community directly, i.e., the PEERING AS directly
peers with the community’s target AS. Four of the pairs involve two AS
hops, while one involves three AS hops. Fully 75% of the community-path
pairs that experience blocking due to the blackhole community did not have
the community’s target AS on the path, either because of non-AS speci￿c
communities (e.g., 65535:666) or due to inaccurate IP-to-ASmapping. These
results largely con￿rm our passive measurements. While the ASes directly
connected to PEERING are expected to honor the advertised communities,
we ￿nd further evidence of communities propagating multiple hops and
being acted upon.
In addition to the testing of previously inferred blackhole communities,
we note that the automated framework we describe here can also be used
to gain con￿dence that a particular community is indeed used by a provider
as a label for RTBH. This is particularly important when using machine
learning or other statistical inference techniques to identify communities.
For instance, while [36] found 307 veri￿able blackhole communities, an
additional 115 were labeled as likely communities. In future work we plan
to test these additional communities.
Limitations: Similarly, we wish in the future to perform automated
active experiments using non-RTBH communities to better understand
their behavior. Such experiments require more complex inference as the
resulting behavior can be subtle and hard to detect (e.g., a path change) as
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compared to RTBH where reachability is a binary test. Moreover, following
the PEERING AUP we are not allowed to conduct an automated experiment
for tra￿c steering and route manipulation attacks as they can trigger path
changes that can potentially impact the operation of the involved networks.
7.7 Other observations
In the process of running experiments in the wild, we ￿nd that it is possible
to inject seemingly contradictory communities. As a case study, we inject
fake location communities, i.e., communities used to tag a pre￿x’s ingress
reception point. We then observe the pre￿x at remote collectors labeled with
communities indicating reception on di￿erent continents. Speaking with
one large operator, we con￿rm that this will not disrupt the overall operation,
as only a few customers will be a￿ected. Nevertheless, we cannot exclude
that other operators may rely on community-based location information in
unanticipated ways, e.g., for tra￿c engineering or other operations.
8 DISCUSSION
BGP communities: Have we gone too far? The e￿ectively global propa-
gation of community tags allows attacks as shown above. On the other hand,
BGP communities are used by network operators to implement policies and
may add useful additional information, e.g., when debugging a network.
They provide a low overhead simple communication channel between ASes.
As such, they are widely in use. However, based on our interaction with
the Internet operators community we gather, the scope of relevance for
most communities is one or two hops. Based on that the Internet operators
community needs to decide whether the bene￿ts of easy communication
outweigh the risks for potential attacks. An extreme way of preventing
the kinds of attacks outlined in this paper would be the following: an AS
only propagates communities which are useful to the receiving peer. To
exemplify, AS1 should send to AS2 only communities of the form 2:xxx.
Au contraire, if AS2 is a route collector, such as RIPE RIS or Route Views,
AS1 might not ￿lter.
Be aware of standardized BGP communities: As we have shown with
the remote blackhole attacks above, there are drawbacks for standardiz-
ing well-known transitive communities which have possibly disruptive
semantics. On the other hand, those which are purely informative are much
less of a concern. Having highly useful active communities not globally
published might be called security through obscurity. Although, as we have
shown, having a highly active community globally known makes life too
easy for the attacker. As such, every operator of a network with known
BGP communities and active semantics should be aware of the potential
rami￿cations and have appropriate countermeasures in place, e.g., BGP
community ￿lters.
Need for BGP communities authentication: Clearly there is a strong
need for the authentication of the right to attach a community to an an-
nouncement or modify one in transit. Unfortunately, there are no known
means to do this. Moreover, adoption of authentication in Internet proto-
cols has been shown to be a slow process, despite the critical role that the
Internet plays in today’s economy and society.
Monitoring the hygiene of BGP communities use: Abuse of commu-
nities might be discouraged by monitoring from the points of view of global
BGP collectors such as RIPE RIS and Route Views, analogous to what is
being done for BGP hijacks today. This strategy comes with all the problems
of BGP monitoring: there is no global BGP view and route collectors only
see the announcement they receive. The latter inferences on what happens
on the path between the origin and the collector very di￿cult. In addition,
the lack of structural semantics of BGP communities leaves a lot of room for
misinterpretations. Of course, well known communities can and should be
monitored. Yet, this only covers a small fraction of the available community
space. Of course, monitoring BGP community behavior is not an active
defense; but attribution of abuse might strongly discourage abuse.
Need for proper documentation: Similar to what is ongoing for bogon
and other ￿ltering, the operational community should publish and update
well tested best current practices and con￿guration patterns for community
generation, propagation, action semantics, etc.
9 CONCLUSION
In this paper, wemeasure the increasing use and propagation of BGP commu-
nities and demonstrate the resulting increase in exposure to abuse by remote
parties; e.g., to blackhole pre￿xes, steer tra￿c, and manipulate routes. A
key insight is that a signi￿cant fraction of transit providers, more than 14%,
forward received communities onward. Given the rich interconnectivity of
the Internet, this means that communities e￿ectively propagate globally.
Attacks are possible due in part to ill-de￿ned BGP community semantics,
error-prone con￿gurations, as well as lack of cryptographic integrity and
authentication for BGP communities.
By analyzing BGP announcements at many collectors worldwide we
observe that, indeed, the propagation of communities is a global Internet
phenomenon which enables routing vulnerabilities at scale. We tested the
feasibility of BGP community-based attacks in lab experiments, then com-
ment on the possibilities to launch such attacks in the wild. Unfortunately,
such BGP attacks are successful even without pre￿x hijacking and even
if BGP authentication is used. We highlight the need to increase aware-
ness among current and future users of BGP communities regarding their
possible abuse cases. We conclude that BGP communities are yet another
highly used BGP feature which can, yet again, yield many unintended
consequences.
As part of our future agenda we want to investigate ways to infer in-
stances of any of the three types of BGP community-based attacks using
passive measurements. This requires the development of a new methodol-
ogy that assigns the role of the tagger of the BGP community to a network
with the intent to perform one of the attacks described in the paper. Notice
that both the relative position of the network in the path and the BGP com-
munity that it tags have to be considered for this inference. Identifying an
attacker in BGP is not trivial due to the lack of authentication and integrity.
We also want to investigate other types of BGP community-based attacks
and assess their feasibility.
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